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LAW LIKE POETRY – BURNT NORTON 
 
 
The heretical impulse surging out of my deftly allocated text draws poetry and law 
into a correspondence – the text being T.S. Eliot’s “Burnt Norton,” the first of the 
Four Quartets.1 I will occasionally trespass on the others: “East Coker,” “The Dry 
Salvages” and “Little Gidding.” 
The comparison is usually, of course, to the opposite effect. Poetry opposes law as 
imagined worlds oppose what is “real,” as the possible opposes the actual and 
established.2 Poetry, says Auden, “makes nothing happen.”3 In the Sufi tradition, 
poetry counters the legalist turn in “official” Islam.4 And there is, perpetually, Plato 
with his supposed hostility to the poet – the poet who confounds the laws by calling 
everything into question, by making “the words of poetry similar to whatever he [the 
poet] happens to be or regards virtue or wickedness.”5 Yet there are ponderable voices 
to the contrary. Laws in many cultures are put poetically, and for Shelley “poets are 
the unacknowledged legislators of the world.”6
Nuancing that opposition now, by way of Goodrich’s leavening sources in 
“Rhetoric and Somatics,” matters become more promisingly mixed.7 Here we find 
law indeed separate from and opposing the poetic but suffering in the separation. Such 
law is somehow deracinated, corrupted, less than it properly is. If, then, poetry is so 
generative and integrally sustaining of law, the two cannot be simply opposed. Freud 
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sets their relation when he sees the originating of law and of society being “achieved 
in his imagination” by “the first epic poet,” and thence embedded in the poetic truth of 
the founding myth the poet invents.8 Like all good myths of origin, this one 
continuously trajects, providing the protean origin of who or what we are now, and in 
this way it remains with-in the law it originates. And yet this is not solely a matter of a 
primal poetic creating law. Law, in Freud’s telling of the myth, is like poetry in being 
“before” the origin, in making that origin possible.9  
With a certain thumping emphasis now, we could agree perversely with Auden that 
“poetry makes nothing happen” – agree that what poetry, along with law, makes 
happen is nothing. The prima materia which poetry and law work on is this “airy 
nothing.”10 “Nothingness is the creator of the world in man… .”11 In poetry, as in 
law, the existent and the inexorable are outflanked and, coming from the nothingness 
beyond them, newness is made manifest. 
Yet the word of poetry and of law is held to, and it is in this quality of holding that 
the word is commonly seen as law. It is something of this same quality that informs 
the taking of The Four Quartets to be the most law-like of Eliot’s poems, with its 
infused sense of precision, with its erecting of some protective “enchainment of past 
and future” (p.192): “And every phrase/And sentence that is right (where every word 
is at home…)” (p.221). 
Yet what is thus captured “for the time being” cannot be enduringly held as the 
same, not only because of the ravening future and its tearing apart of “inveterate 
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scars” (p.191), of what is healed and hardened into establishment, but also because of 
the insistence in the “always present” of “what might have been” (p.190), and the 
insistence of a past that is never past – “the recurrent end of the unending” (p.216). 
Then: “Words strain,/Crack and sometimes break, under the burden,/…Decay with 
imprecision, will not stay in place…” (p.194). Thence, “every attempt” at using words 
“is a wholly new start, and a different kind of failure” (p.202). And so, the comparison 
waiting, for Derrida it is the “failure” of law, something “rotten” in it, which impels 
its going beyond, impels its responsiveness and “giving” to the insatiable demand of 
that “justice” which is ever beyond.12 Plangently, law leaps towards and retreats from 
illimitable possibility in the partial success, but inextricable failure, of its “doing” 
justice. This, for Derrida again, is law as “fiction”, ever supervening on law’s own 
positivist pretension.13  
Perhaps, then, law is most like poetry in this utter responsiveness. The poet, says 
Rilke, is “he or she who is ready for everything.”14 The poet’s strength is the lack of 
strength, and the lack in strength:  
 
Spender told Auden he wondered whether he, Spender, ought to write prose. But Auden put his foot 
down. ‘You must write nothing but poetry, we do not want to lose you for poetry.’ ‘But do you really 
think I’m any good?’ gulped Spender. ‘Of course,’ Auden frigidly replied. ‘But why?’ ‘Because you 
are so infinitely capable of being humiliated. Art is born of humiliation.’15
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“Humility is endless,” adds Eliot (p.199). Yet if “this brings forth possibilities that are 
entirely other,” a completeness of response to alterity becomes entirely self-
annihilating, death; but what is involved also is the subordination of this death to 
possibility realized.16  
What position, then, may poetry and law take in-between realization and 
responsiveness? We are left “with the intolerable wrestle/With words and meanings” 
(p.198). There is no abiding stay. “I can only say, there we have been: but I cannot 
say where” (p.191). Yet, my final “yet,” there is a stillness. 
 
At the still point of the turning world. Neither flesh nor 
fleshless; 
Neither from nor towards; at the still point, there the dance 
is, 
But neither arrest nor movement. And do not call it fixity…(p.191) 
 
Words can reach the stillness “only by the form, the pattern” (p.194), and “the detail 
of the pattern is movement” (p.195). Pattern or form can only be itself in a movement 
through and beyond itself, a denial of itself – “the pattern is new in every moment” 
(p.199). Movement, movement in space and time, can only be itself in a pattern or 
form through and beyond itself, and this also in denial of itself – “caught in the form 
of limitation” (p.195). 
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In order to possess what you do not possess 
You must go by the way of dispossession. (p. 201)17
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